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Letter to the Editor
The cooked and the raw
Dear Sir,
I couldn’t possibly begin to reply, in any detail,
to Mr. Farradane’s comments on ’The cooked and
the raw’ [see Journal of Information SCience, vol. 3,
no. 6, pp. 261-267 and 269-270] - nor should
such a reply really be necessary. Mr. Farradane
has, as he himself admits, clearly had difficulties
trying &dquo;to clear a path ... through [my] philosophi-
cal jungle,&dquo; and so he has, for the most part,
simply resorted to contradiction rather than argu-
mentation. But at the core of Mr. Farradane’s
theory of information lies a theory of language
(which he amplifies in his comments), and it is this
linguistic core that I should like to take a closer
look at since it seems to be a bit, shall we sa_v, soft.
To say that writing is language is like saying
that a picture of a cow is a cow. Mr. Farradane
claims that &dquo;We can associate ’streaks of ink’
(writing) with sounds and concepts directly.&dquo; If
this indeed were the case, then he should have no
trouble in directly apprehending the concepts in
(and thus the meaning of) the following:
( 1 ) Ja jalla sardno aBdnag sanid
To do this without resorting to knowledge residing
ol1~r within a human mind should prove about as
easy as getting milk from a picture of a cow. If the
set of streaks ’CAT’ can be associated ilirectli- (i.e.,
without any mediation) with the concept ‘cat’,
then why is it that we have to be taught to read
and write? Clearly, the ’association’ here is not
direct, but mediated by something learned.
Similarly, one can easily demonstrate that
’streaks of ink’ cannot be directly associated with
sounds. Consider the following sets of ’streaks’:
( ? ) mat t ( 3 ) mate
To associate each individual ’streak’ (i.e. letter)
with an individual sound (let’s use phonetic svm-
bols for these), we may proceed (by convention)
from left to right, associating each letter with a
sound. For (2), the letter ’m’ is then associated
with [m], ’a’ with [xJ, and ’t’ with [t]. Now, in (3)
we proceed in the same manner, associating ’m’
with [m], ’a’ with [ze]. ’t’ with [t] - and by now we
have obviously gone astray. The letter ’a’ in (3) is
not to be associated with the sound [x], but with
[ey]. And what about the final letter ’e’? What
sound is it associated with? If anything, it is
associated with the first vowel of the word, telling
us that this vowel is to be pronounced [eyl, not [xl.
But this means that we cannot make any proper
associations for the letter ’a’ in (3) until we have
reached the end of the word, and the association
made in (2) could be only tentative, pending the
possibility that a silent ’e’ might show up later on.
The vowel sound in (3) is associated with a discon-
tinuous set of streaks, the ’a’ and the ’e’.
English is rife with discontinuities of this sort,
and their existence precludes any direct associa-
tion (in any non-Pickwickian sense of ’direct’)
between letters and sounds. But then, of course, no
one in the reading business would maintain any-
more that reading is a matter of letter-by-letter
processing.
Mr. Farradane’s views on language learning are
also highly suspect. He claims that language is
&dquo;learned by association with percepts, e.g. the
word ’cat’ and the observable animal.&dquo; But he fails
to explain (as have all associationists) how such an
association could take place. If he believes that
this can be accomplished by ostension - i.e., by
someone pointing to a cat and saying &dquo;cat&dquo; - then
he is out of luck, for it has long been known that
ostensive definitions of this kind simply do not
work. One cannot point to the meaning of a word.
Pointing and saying &dquo;cat&dquo; could just as well lead
to ’associations’ between the observed animal (the
percept, on Mr. Farradane’s view) and meanings
such as ’furry animal’, ’quadruped’, ’grev’, ’this
particular animal’ (i.e., a proper name), ’soft to the
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touch’, ’the cause of allergies’, ’beast that bites me
when I try to touch it’, and so on, ad (almost)
//!///!/~~!.
Nor is Mr. Farradane’s notion of perception at
all clear. He repeatedly speaks of ’direct associa-
tions’ between concepts and, e.g., ’streaks of ink’.
Yet, he also claims that we view the world by
means of sense data (which he equates with per-
cepts). If the ’streaks of ink’ really are streaks of
ink, then, of course, the associations are not direct,
but mediated by percepts. If, on the other hand,
by ’streaks of ink’ he means percepts, then, for
these to be recognized as ’streaks of ink’ (or recog-
nized as anything, for that matter) will require the
involvement of conceptual knowledge. One cannot
recognize something as ’something’, except in terms
of a concept of that ’something’. This is what
makes any categorical distinction between percept
and concept untenable. The two are of the same
kind. -
Of course, it is always permissible to assign a
technical meaning to a word, and use it with that
meaning within a circumscribed domain. But there
is always a danger lurking here: One runs the risk
of becoming Pickwickian, or, at worst, of sliding
into the know-nothingism characteristic of reli-
gions and pseudo-sciences (such as astrology)
which exist in self-created, intellectual vacuums.
So when Mr. Farradane proposes to define infor-
mation as &dquo;mainly, writing or speech used for
communication of knowledge&dquo;, he shall have to
submit to scrutiny from the cognitive sciences
which have revolutionized our views on language,
knowledge, and perception over the last quarter
century. Under such scrutiny, I’m afraid, Mr. Far-
radane’s theories of information fall apart.
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